Litigation

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Who can’t recover for defamation even though they may have been libeled?

The libel-proof plaintiff.

The “libel-proof plaintiff” doctrine provides an independent ground for dismissing a defamation cause of action on the basis that a person with a widespread reputation for bad or dishonest behavior may not recover. Often defendants will raise this doctrine when moving to dismiss a complaint or moving for summary judgment. The underlying rationale for the application of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine across federal and state courts to a plaintiff with a well-known “sullied reputation” is that an alleged defamatory statement pertaining to a plaintiff’s reputation, or crimes, cannot further harm such a plaintiff’s already-damaged reputation.

So how does a plaintiff become “libel-proof”?

Continue Reading The Libel-Proof Plaintiff

Should California courts permit litigants to conduct discovery into litigation funding, namely whether a third party is funding their adversary’s litigation efforts?

Certainly, parties defending a case will want to know, “Who are we really litigating against, and what are their true motives?” “Who is the real party in interest here?” And even if a litigation funder is not the same thing as a plaintiff, a funder may have a significant role to play in the case. After all, “[h]e who pays the piper may not always call the tune, but he’ll likely have an influence on the playlist.” Conlon v. Rosa, No. 295907, 2004 WL 1627337, at *2 (Mass. Land Ct. July 21, 2004).

So, are litigation funding arrangements discoverable? While courts across the country are split on this issue, state legislatures and select judicial districts have begun to intervene and enact disclosure requirements relating to such funding.Continue Reading To Be or Not to Be…Discoverable: Third-Party Litigation Funders

On February 25, 2025, the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who obtain a preliminary injunction are not eligible for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) because they do not qualify as “prevailing parties.” See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. ___ (2025). Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, explained that obtaining a preliminary injunction does not confer “prevailing party” status under § 1988. The Court reasoned that preliminary injunctions do not provide “enduring judicial relief on the merits.”

This case began in late 2018 when a group of Virginia drivers challenged a Virginia statute that permitted the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles to suspend the licenses of individuals who failed to pay court fines. The drivers asserted that this statute violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause “as applied to people who cannot afford to pay due to their modest financial circumstances.” The United States District Court for the District of Virginia granted the drivers a preliminary injunction in December 2018, thereby prohibiting the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles from suspending licenses for failure to pay court fines.Continue Reading U.S. Supreme Court Decision Prohibits Plaintiff Recovery of Attorney’s Fees After a Preliminary Injunction Win

Introduction

As recent high-profile litigation, government investigations, and large-scale data-security incidents have shown, organizations are often thrust into crisis mode, requiring rapid responses and close collaboration with third parties, such as public relations consultants, crisis management teams, and forensic accountants and investigators, in order to address the crisis holistically. While these third-party partners are vital in steering an organization through a difficult period, it is imperative to take steps to protect communications with these external partners and safeguard the confidentiality of sensitive and even privileged information.

Generally, the attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications requesting or receiving legal advice between an attorney and their client. The confidential nature of these communications is important, and the privilege can be jeopardized if third parties are included. However, there are important exceptions to the general rule. First, the “common interest” (or “joint defense”) doctrine extends the attorney-client privilege to communications between attorneys and third parties with a shared legal interest (such as co-counsel in an active lawsuit), but it requires active collaboration on a common legal strategy or issue, not just business strategies with incidental legal concerns. Second, privilege can also extend to third-party consultants (such as private investigators, accountants, public relations professionals, etc.), as long as their involvement is essential to aiding the understanding between legal counsel and the client.Continue Reading Communicating in a Crisis: Tips for Protecting Communications When It Matters Most