In the age of group chats and rumor mills, telling even one person a damaging rumor can unleash consequences far beyond the intent of the original conversation. But when does gossip cross the legal line?

A recent decision out of the Central District of Illinois, Holzgrafe v. Lozier, offers key guidance on this interesting defamation principle.

1. Can You Be Liable for Spreading a Rumor?

Yes.

Continue Reading When Gossip Becomes Defamation: Liability for Rumors and Their Ripple Effects

Who can’t recover for defamation even though they may have been libeled?

The libel-proof plaintiff.

The “libel-proof plaintiff” doctrine provides an independent ground for dismissing a defamation cause of action on the basis that a person with a widespread reputation for bad or dishonest behavior may not recover. Often defendants will raise this doctrine when moving to dismiss a complaint or moving for summary judgment. The underlying rationale for the application of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine across federal and state courts to a plaintiff with a well-known “sullied reputation” is that an alleged defamatory statement pertaining to a plaintiff’s reputation, or crimes, cannot further harm such a plaintiff’s already-damaged reputation.

So how does a plaintiff become “libel-proof”?

Continue Reading The Libel-Proof Plaintiff

Should California courts permit litigants to conduct discovery into litigation funding, namely whether a third party is funding their adversary’s litigation efforts?

Certainly, parties defending a case will want to know, “Who are we really litigating against, and what are their true motives?” “Who is the real party in interest here?” And even if a litigation funder is not the same thing as a plaintiff, a funder may have a significant role to play in the case. After all, “[h]e who pays the piper may not always call the tune, but he’ll likely have an influence on the playlist.” Conlon v. Rosa, No. 295907, 2004 WL 1627337, at *2 (Mass. Land Ct. July 21, 2004).

So, are litigation funding arrangements discoverable? While courts across the country are split on this issue, state legislatures and select judicial districts have begun to intervene and enact disclosure requirements relating to such funding.

Continue Reading To Be or Not to Be…Discoverable: Third-Party Litigation Funders

On April 24, 2025, the California Supreme Court held that contract clauses that limit damages for injuries caused by willful tortious conduct are prohibited by Section 1668 of the California Civil Code.

In New England Country Foods, LLC v. VanLaw Food Products, Inc., No. S282968, 2025 Cal. LEXIS 2299 (Cal. Apr. 24, 2025), a barbecue sauce company sued a manufacturer for allegedly secretly attempting to replicate its popular barbecue sauce and sell it to Trader Joe’s. The barbecue sauce company, New England Country Foods (NECF), asserted both contract and tort claims against VanLaw, but VanLaw responded that the claims were barred by a contractual clause between the two parties that purported to limit damages for willful injuries caused by either party.

Continue Reading California Supreme Court Finds Parties Cannot Contract Away Liability for Willful Injury

On March 6, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed that historical events are not subject to copyright protection. 

This is true even if the events were discovered through original research. In Ackerman v. Pink, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40028 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2025), the court explained that although copyright protection applies to an artistic expression of historical events, the events themselves are not subject to copyright protection.  

This case began in August 2023, when Plaintiff Daniel Ackerman brought claims for copyright infringement, unfair competition, and tortious interference against individuals and companies that contributed to the production of the 2023 film Tetris. Ackerman alleged that the film contained “glaring similarities” to his own book, The Tetris Effect: The Game That Hypnotized The World, which was copyrighted and published in September 2016. Ackerman further asserted that the creators of the film used his book to create the film without his consent. To substantiate his claims, Ackerman provided the court with an “exhaustive analysis and examination of the film and the book” that outlined “the substantial similarities between the two works.”

Continue Reading New York District Court Confirms Limits of Copyright Protection Regarding Historical Events

When meme coins—crypto tokens that usually do not purport to have any utility but are often just a single digital image of a dog, frog, or celebrity—began to be popularized, many skeptics thought that they were a joke, primarily because there was no discernible value and because of the onslaught of seemingly bad actors who took advantage of small investors. This skepticism was most recently supported by the fiasco surrounding the “Hawktuah Girl” influencer, whose meme coin hit almost a half a billion dollars in market cap and then lost about 95% of its value within hours of reaching its peak, resulting in a lawsuit against her and the other promoters. Meanwhile, other meme coins, such as Dogecoin—an image of a cute dog—have enjoyed astronomical and sustained value, which, in the case of Dogecoin, is currently around $29 billion in market cap. President Trump’s organization sold a meme coin shortly before his second inauguration. He and his administration have been clear about seeking to create a more permissive, crypto industry-friendly regulatory framework in the U.S. Meme coins seem to be here to stay.

On February 27, 2025, the Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated the division staff’s view that meme coins do not generally involve the offer and sale of securities under the federal securities laws. While the statement is merely a view of the SEC staff and is not thereby a law passed by Congress or a rule set by the Commission, this statement may signal the direction Congress and the administration intend to take on meme coins when legislation or rulemaking ultimately takes shape, as we expect this year.

Continue Reading SEC Staff Says Meme Coins Are Not Securities

On February 25, 2025, the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who obtain a preliminary injunction are not eligible for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) because they do not qualify as “prevailing parties.” See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. ___ (2025). Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, explained that obtaining a preliminary injunction does not confer “prevailing party” status under § 1988. The Court reasoned that preliminary injunctions do not provide “enduring judicial relief on the merits.”

This case began in late 2018 when a group of Virginia drivers challenged a Virginia statute that permitted the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles to suspend the licenses of individuals who failed to pay court fines. The drivers asserted that this statute violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause “as applied to people who cannot afford to pay due to their modest financial circumstances.” The United States District Court for the District of Virginia granted the drivers a preliminary injunction in December 2018, thereby prohibiting the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles from suspending licenses for failure to pay court fines.

Continue Reading U.S. Supreme Court Decision Prohibits Plaintiff Recovery of Attorney’s Fees After a Preliminary Injunction Win

On February 11, 2025, Judge Stephanos Bibas issued an opinion in Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GMBH v. Ross Intelligence Inc., civ. no. 1:20-cv-613, a dispute regarding copyright infringement allegations stemming from the use of copyrighted data from the Westlaw legal database used in the training of an AI search tool. Judge Bibas, sitting by designation in this matter from the Third Circuit, granted partial summary judgment to Thomson Reuters on direct copyright infringement and determined that Thomson Reuters’ Westlaw key number system and more than 2,200 headnotes were impermissibly used to create Ross’s competing product and are original enough to be protected by copyright.

After finding that the Westlaw system was copyrightable, Judge Bibas rejected Ross’s fair-use defense. In the highly anticipated opinion, Judge Bibas found that two key factors of the “four factor fair use analysis” favored Thomson Reuters. Specifically, the purpose of Ross’s use of headnotes from Thomson Reuters’ Westlaw legal research service and its harm to the market for the originals both favor Thomson Reuters. Therefore, Ross’s fair use defense failed, and using Westlaw’s copyrighted headnotes to train Ross’s AI search tool was found to be copyright infringement.

Continue Reading Judge Rejects Fair Use Defense in Thomson Reuters’ AI Copyright Suit Against Ross Intelligence

Introduction

As recent high-profile litigation, government investigations, and large-scale data-security incidents have shown, organizations are often thrust into crisis mode, requiring rapid responses and close collaboration with third parties, such as public relations consultants, crisis management teams, and forensic accountants and investigators, in order to address the crisis holistically. While these third-party partners are vital in steering an organization through a difficult period, it is imperative to take steps to protect communications with these external partners and safeguard the confidentiality of sensitive and even privileged information.

Generally, the attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications requesting or receiving legal advice between an attorney and their client. The confidential nature of these communications is important, and the privilege can be jeopardized if third parties are included. However, there are important exceptions to the general rule. First, the “common interest” (or “joint defense”) doctrine extends the attorney-client privilege to communications between attorneys and third parties with a shared legal interest (such as co-counsel in an active lawsuit), but it requires active collaboration on a common legal strategy or issue, not just business strategies with incidental legal concerns. Second, privilege can also extend to third-party consultants (such as private investigators, accountants, public relations professionals, etc.), as long as their involvement is essential to aiding the understanding between legal counsel and the client.

Continue Reading Communicating in a Crisis: Tips for Protecting Communications When It Matters Most

On June 18, 2024, California Attorney General (AG) Rob Bonta announced a third CCPA enforcement settlement, this one with Tilting Point Media LLC. Tilting Point was allegedly using its mobile app game “SpongeBob: Krusty Cook-Off” to collect, share, and sell the data of minors, in violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). Tilting Point agreed to pay a $500,000 civil penalty and implement certain measures to address the alleged violations. The settlement is notable for combining enforcement of COPPA alongside the CCPA, targeting similar practices but different age groups under each law. Also notably, the AG investigated Tilting Point after the Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU) of BBB National Programs issued findings alleging that Tilting Point’s practices violated COPPA. The AG alleged that Tilting Point failed to correct its practices following the investigation by CARU. The case illustrates the risks of ignoring industry self-regulatory reviews and provides a roadmap other states can use to leverage multiple laws against the same activities.

The AG’s complaint focused on the key allegations outlined below:

Continue Reading California Attorney General’s Recent Enforcement of CCPA and COPPA