Targeted public protests can quickly place businesses and individuals in highly visible and legally sensitive situations. When demonstrators gather outside a workplace or private residence—for example, if an activist group takes issue with an organization’s business practices and elects to target that organization’s executives—the activity may feel disruptive, intimidating, or even threatening.

The legal framework governing targeted picketing and protesting reflects a balance between First Amendment protections and legitimate interests in privacy, access, and safety. Understanding where that balance lies is critical for anyone navigating a targeted demonstration.

Continue Reading Navigating Targeted Protests at the Office and at Home

Last month, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law Senate Bill 683, which makes a significant addition to Civil Code § 3344, California’s Right of Publicity statute. With the amendment, § 3344 now expressly authorizes injunctive relief, which strengthens individuals’ ability to protect their name, image, voice, and likeness from unauthorized use.

Previously, under the prior version of § 3344, a person whose name, image, or likeness was used on merchandise products and in advertising without prior consent could recover statutory or actual damages, any profits attributable to the use, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Now, the new law clarifies that those monetary remedies are not exclusive, and a plaintiff may also seek temporary restraining orders (TROs) and preliminary injunctions under California Code of Civil Procedure § 527. Furthermore, if a court grants a TRO, the defendant must “remove, recall, or otherwise cease” the unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness within two business days after the order is served, unless the court’s order states otherwise. Although courts already had the power to issue injunctive relief under general civil procedure when irreparable harm could be shown, there was no explicit statutory right associated with right of publicity claims and no time deadlines for TRO compliance by defendants. SB 683 makes the remedial process more concrete, giving right of publicity plaintiffs a quicker route to stop the misuse of their name, image, or likeness, rather than being at risk of ongoing irreparable harm and waiting for a final judgment.

Continue Reading California’s Updated Right of Publicity Statute Provides Increased Protection and Expedited Relief

In a recent interview with The Recorder, Venable partners Lee Brenner and David Fink, based in Los Angeles, weighed in on two major developments shaping today’s defamation litigation landscape: the sharp increase in defamation lawsuits and the troubling erosion of California’s anti-SLAPP protections.

According to Brenner, 2025 has become what he calls “The Year of Defamation,” driven in part by the cultural impact of high-profile trials like Johnny Depp v. Amber Heard. “The cool kids are suing for defamation,” he remarked, noting a clear uptick in both serious and meritless cases. Fink added that the role of social media, and its ability to spread information widely and instantly, with little oversight, have only fueled the trend.

Continue Reading Defamation on the Rise and Anti-SLAPP Protections at Risk: Lee Brenner and David Fink Featured in The Recorder

In the past few months, the administration, the Copyright Office, and the courts have weighed in on several material issues at the cross section of copyright law and AI. The White House’s recent announcement of its AI Action Plan offers an opportunity to examine the interesting alignment and discord on key issues relating to fair use.

Specifically, this article dissects three key issues and how they are being considered in the evaluation of fair use: the use of pirated works for training AI models; the “dilution” theory of market harm; and whether legislation and regulation are necessary. While there are clear points of divergence between the White House, the Copyright Office, and the courts, the areas of alignment provide a foundational framework for stakeholders to navigate today’s landscape while also preparing for tomorrow’s inevitable changes. 

Continue Reading Whose Rules Rule? Different Approaches to Key AI and Copyright Fair Use Principles Across the Administration, Copyright Office, and the Courts

Statements of pure opinion are not actionable as defamation, as they do not imply facts capable of being proven true or false. Qureshi v. St. Barnabas Hosp. Ctr., 430 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Cochran v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

However, not every opinion qualifies as a pure opinion. And not every opinion is safe from liability for defamation. Some opinions cross the line.

A recent court decision in Fradkoff v. Winston out of the Southern District of New York sheds light on how, and when, opinions may become defamatory.

Fradkoff, the plaintiff, and Winston, the defendant, both worked for a prestigious jewelry company founded by the defendant’s father. Fradkoff v. Winston, 24 Civ. 1830 (VM), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118444, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2025). After his father’s death, the defendant assumed control of the company and later published a biography about his father’s leadership. Id. The book portrayed the plaintiff negatively, and the plaintiff brought a defamation claim. Id. at *3-4.

Continue Reading When Do Opinions Become Defamation?

In the second landmark decision this week relating to whether use of copyrighted content for training generative AI qualifies as a fair use, Judge Chhabria, in the federal court for the Northern District of California, ordered summary judgment in favor of Meta Platforms Inc. (Meta), finding that Meta’s copying of a group of 13 bestselling authors’ books as training data for use in Meta’s large language training model (LLM) “Llama” was a fair use. Kadrey, et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., Case No. 23-cv-0317-VC. This groundbreaking decision out of the NDCA follows Judge Alsup’s ruling earlier this week that Anthropic’s use of legally obtained books for training its LLMs was a fair use, Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC, which we covered here.

The orders in both cases determined that the LLM’s use of copyrighted data for training generative AI was “highly transformative” and that the first copyright fair use factor therefore weighed heavily in favor of the AI developers. In both cases, the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate sufficient market harm to overcome the heavy weight placed on the transformative nature of the AI models. The decisions, however, differed notably as to each judge’s consideration of the source of the copyrighted works and whether the works were obtained through authorized channels or from “pirate websites.”

Continue Reading Back-to-Back Fair Use Decisions: Two NDCA Courts Find Fair Use for AI Training, Emphasizing That the Specific Facts Concerning Alleged Market Harm Will Be Critical in Overcoming AI’s “Highly Transformative” Technology

On June 23, 2025, Judge Alsup in the Northern District of California issued an order in Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC, granting in part and denying in part Defendant Anthropic’s motion for summary judgment on the sole issue of whether its use of Plaintiffs’ books as training data for Anthropic’s large language models (LLMs) was “quintessential” fair use.

Central to its mixed holding, the court acknowledged that Anthropic used the works in various ways and for varying purposes, such that each “use” must be identified and assessed separately. Ultimately, the court held that while the use of textual works to train LLMs was “exceedingly transformative” and thereby was protected as fair use when considered against the remaining factors, the separate use of the works to create a central library was only fair use with respect to works purchased or lawfully accessed—i.e., the use of pirated copies to create the central library was not protectible fair use. This decision makes clear that the source of content is a key element in evaluating fair use.

Continue Reading Court Holds That Anthropic’s Training of AI Using Legally Obtained Books Is Fair Use, but Storage of Pirated Books Is Not

In the age of group chats and rumor mills, telling even one person a damaging rumor can unleash consequences far beyond the intent of the original conversation. But when does gossip cross the legal line?

A recent decision out of the Central District of Illinois, Holzgrafe v. Lozier, offers key guidance on this interesting defamation principle.

1. Can You Be Liable for Spreading a Rumor?

Yes.

Continue Reading When Gossip Becomes Defamation: Liability for Rumors and Their Ripple Effects

Who can’t recover for defamation even though they may have been libeled?

The libel-proof plaintiff.

The “libel-proof plaintiff” doctrine provides an independent ground for dismissing a defamation cause of action on the basis that a person with a widespread reputation for bad or dishonest behavior may not recover. Often defendants will raise this doctrine when moving to dismiss a complaint or moving for summary judgment. The underlying rationale for the application of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine across federal and state courts to a plaintiff with a well-known “sullied reputation” is that an alleged defamatory statement pertaining to a plaintiff’s reputation, or crimes, cannot further harm such a plaintiff’s already-damaged reputation.

So how does a plaintiff become “libel-proof”?

Continue Reading The Libel-Proof Plaintiff

Should California courts permit litigants to conduct discovery into litigation funding, namely whether a third party is funding their adversary’s litigation efforts?

Certainly, parties defending a case will want to know, “Who are we really litigating against, and what are their true motives?” “Who is the real party in interest here?” And even if a litigation funder is not the same thing as a plaintiff, a funder may have a significant role to play in the case. After all, “[h]e who pays the piper may not always call the tune, but he’ll likely have an influence on the playlist.” Conlon v. Rosa, No. 295907, 2004 WL 1627337, at *2 (Mass. Land Ct. July 21, 2004).

So, are litigation funding arrangements discoverable? While courts across the country are split on this issue, state legislatures and select judicial districts have begun to intervene and enact disclosure requirements relating to such funding.

Continue Reading To Be or Not to Be…Discoverable: Third-Party Litigation Funders